yields

From Rome With Love? The 3 Issues To Watch For Italy & Global Markets

This article made the Front Page of the Huffington Post Business

Political uncertainty in Italy could impact global markets, but provide a “fantastic buying opportunity.”

cnbc squawk

Like Jennifer Lawrence’s fall at the Oscars, unexpected but a chance to shine ‘comedically‘, Italy’s elections have shocked investors but provided attractive entry points to strong international firms, insulated from domestic woes (as well as offer up some funny one-liners from candidates). The possible loss of eagerly anticipated labour reforms, financial restrictions and market contagion provide shorter term sources of turmoil. However, existing reforms are likely to continue, market retrenchment is healthy and to be exploited for longer term opportunities.

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The EU ‘Rescue Fund’ – Part of The Problem Not The Solution

There is still much to be decided before EU leaders can claim to have provided a comprehensive and credible plan to end the sovereign debt crisis. The rescue fund itself has met with significant obstacles, with demand in doubt and delays to capital raising leading to question marks over its ability to borrow on behalf of those that can’t. Instead of improving sentiment, it may cause it to deteriorate. Details, commitment, growth, structural reforms and greater consolidation of governance, fiscal policy and politics are needed. This has become a global issue.

Deutsche Bank, Germany’s biggest bank, and Credit Agricole, the largest retail banking group in France, rallied more than 19% over the last week in October after certain ‘positive’ news was announced at EU Summit. Measures included the leveraging of the rescue fund to €1tn, a voluntary default of Greek debt and bank recapitalisation. However, this may involve a dangerous derivative structure with insurance coverage not guaranteed and demands not going far enough.

Delays could hit sentiment, deadline looming

The European Financial Stability Fund (a.k.a. the ‘rescue fund’) was created to borrow on behalf of those countries that found themselves unable to borrow (read Greece, Ireland, Portugal etc). However, Wednesday’s attempt to raise capital met a substantial obstacle – limited demand, leaving the fund itself unable to borrow. The €3bn 10-year bond offering had to be postponed, in the hope conditions would improve but a ‘red flag’ has been raised. If this fund is already having issues, at its current size with a lending capacity of €440bn, how will it manage with demands up to €1tn? Inadequate demand could cause sentiment to deteriorate, worsening the very situation it was meant to improve.

Demand from the East now in doubt

Plans to leverage the current fund to enable this €1tn of firepower seem to be heavily reliant on demand from the likes of China and Japan. This makes their apparent lack of interest in this recent bond offering most worrying. Investors have maintained the situation is too opaque and the risk/reward potential too skewed to the downside.

Dangerous derivative structure

The ‘Special Purpose Investment Vehicle’ which would allow this leveraging to occur has been likened to a CDO – collateralised debt obligation and the instrument that was at the heart of the subprime crisis, by insuring investors against loss. The bonds act as collateral so investors effectively buy junk sovereign debt with a certain level of guarantee from the fund.

The Greek ‘haircut’ has highlighted some of the risks. The ‘writedown’ of debt was structured as ‘voluntary’. It was agreed that private bond holders should offer to write off half of the amount Greece owed them versus a formal, official, enforced default. The latter would be classified as a credit event and trigger any insurers to pay up. However, the former doesn’t. Therefore investors who insured against losses paid a premium for cover but won’t get paid out to offset the losses suffered. The risk of a debt ‘default’ may not always be mitigated.

 Doesn’t cover all that is needed

More details are needed to understand how bailout facilities will be implemented and hopes for the first signs of commitment from the IMF, China and Japan were dashed at the G20 Meeting last Thursday and Friday. Moreover, the recapitalisation of the banks, which was set at €140bn will need to be increased dramatically. The IMF already put the level at €200bn, with analysts advising a number nearer €275bn.

Finally, the fund does not compensate for what the EU really needs: growth, structural reforms and greater consolidation of governance, fiscal policy and politics. The EU’s jobless figures are the highest they’ve been since the launch of the euro. Draghi may have put the focus back on growth by cutting interest rates, in a move that surprised the markets, from 1.5% to 1.25% but admitted growth forecasts are likely to be downgraded so the EU economy will remain fragile for some time. Accounting for approximately 24% of global GDP and with lower demand hitting export-oriented Asian countries, as for example Taiwan expands at its slowest rate for 2 years.

This is a global issue.

European “Financial Mechanisms” – Can they solve the EU’s problems? And how can I make money from the concern?

World unity is the wish of the hopeful, the goal of the idealist and the dream of the romantic. Yet it is folly to the realist and a lie to the innocent – Don Williams, Jr  (American , b.1968)

There has been much in the news lately on the outlook for the European Union. In May, Greece was offered €120bn in EU government and IMF loans over 3 years to replace the need for new borrowing at exorbitant market rates – the “first bailout of a Eurozone country and the biggest bailout of any country”.  Just last month Ireland joined the queue and received a €85bn injection plan. The flame of contagion was burning bright as investors worried Spain, Portugal and Italy were to follow suit quickly (The other members of the PIIGS acronym – and we’ve been advised what risks lie in an acronym!). Then just as markets calmed after the ECB staged their largest intervention and purchased mainly Portuguese and Irish bonds on Friday, the rating agency Moody’s announced it was downgrading Hungary’s debt by not one but two notches!  This country isn’t even in the periphery of the EU, it’s outside of it entirely… and so the contagion spreads….

Source: Bloomberg. The premium investors demand for investing in Irish government bonds over German bunds remains elevated (indicating a perceived heightened risk)

Why won’t the EU bailouts solve everything?

1. FLAWED LOGIC: attempting to solve the problem of debt with more debt

2. NOT SOLVING PROBLEM: without growth, the debt burden as a share of GDP will continue to rise. The latest European Financial Mechanism only covers maters until 2013,  if Debt/GDP has not reduced significantly then bond holders start sharing the pain

3. UNCERTAINTY: ministers keep changing their minds! (“no bail out” to “bailout”, “no pain for creditors” to “sharing the burden”) – markets don’t like uncertainty!

The key discrepancy –

What the ECB wants EU countries to do: Be prepared to increase the size of emergency bailouts, consolidate budgets and reform (implement austerity measures and assume national responsibility so the ECB can avoid being a bailout tool)

What EU country economies need: COMPETITIVENESS AND GROWTH

Market Impacts

  • YIELDS may have fallen sharply for some periphery debt but as the chart before shows, they remain at elevated levels.
  • FORCED SELLING – Pension funds, insurance cos and ETFs which are focused on matching the liabilities to their assets may have to sell certain debt when its credit rating is cut

How can you exploit this?

“Europe is difficult to understand for markets. They work in an irrational way sometimes,” Christine Lagarde, French economy minister

  1. Companies located in an EU periphery country, with strong balance sheets and demand insulated from worries about their homeland (i.e. international exposure and demand for their products from the east etc) making it a sound investment choice, may suffer from illogical moves in the markets that punish anything connected to the country regardless. This debt can be picked up cheaply.
  2. In addition, a downgrade in a country’s government debt may trigger a wave of forced sellers (the pension funds etc. mentioned above) that are restricted in holding this level of debt. If this is just an automatic trade, these distressed sellers may be exploited with the purchasing power in your hands